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Abstracl
This paper considers an application of the differential approach to Japanese demand for
beef imports from 1970 to 1993. Results of homothetic demand and negative (significant) own-
price elasticities indicate that the Japanese did not discriminate against Australian beef, but the
decrease in Australia’s trade shares was due to changes in relative prices.
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Historically, Japan has protected its beef
producers from imported beef with various policies
such as domestic producer price supports, import
quotas, and import tariffs. Before 1970, Japan
imported an insignificant portion of the beef it
consumed. Although Japan has more than doubled
its production of beef over the past 20 years, the
demand for beef has increased even more rapidly
due to increases in per capita income. By 1990,
beef imports contributed to approximately 30
percent of total beef consumption in Japan.
Due to greater Japanese demand for beef,
combined with limitations on increasing domestic
production and pressure from beef exporting
countries, Japan agreed in June 1988 to a six-year
plan, the Beef Market Access Agreement (BMAA).
This agreement reduced quota restrictions on
imported beef and agreed to increase Japanese beef
imports by 60,000 metric tons (ret) per year through
1990. The Japanese also agreed to replace the
import quota by a temporary 70 percent import
tariff in 1991, and to reduce the tariff to 60 percent
in 1992 and to 50 percent in 1993. Afler 1993, any
further reductions will be undertaken in the context
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT). However, Japan reserves the right to
impose a 25 percent tariff in any year that beef
imports increase by 20 percent over the previous
year (Coyle 1984 and 1990).
Given these changes in Japan’s beef
policies, the three major exporters (i.e., Australia,
New Zealand, and the U.S.) are concerned about the
effects these policies will have on their beef exports
to Japan. The Australians have complained that
U.S. beef imports have been given favorable
treatment by Japan (Coyle and Dyck).1 Their
argument can be supported by looking at the budget
shares over time in table 1. Australia’s trade shares
moved from 79 percent in 1970 to 41 percent in
1993 (column 2), while the U.S.’s trade shares went
from 4 to 56 percent (column 4) over the same time
period. The U.S. denies these allegations and
suggests that Japanese consumers prefer U.S.
grainfed beef to the grassfed beef which Australia
and New Zealand produce.
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the
Japanese import market for beef and determine
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Table 1. CountnesTrade SharesandPricesfor [reportedBeef to Japan,1970-1993.
Trade Shares over Time
New
Year Australia Zealand U.s Other
(1) @) (3) (4) (5)
1970 ,79 14 04 ,03
1971 85 10 ,34 01
1972 90 08 .03 01
I973 .86 06 .07 01
1974 .78 .06 .15 .01
I975 72 .07 20 .0 I
1976 70 07 .22 0!
\977 ,73 06 .19 01
1978 ,73 07 .19 02
1979 70 ,05 23 ,02
1980 71 .03 .24 .02
1981 67 .05 .26 ,02
1982 63 ,S14 31 ,0!
1983 .61 .05 .34 ,01
1984 .60 .05 .33 .01
1985 ,56 05 .36 03
1986 52 04 ,4 I 03
1987 .48 03 .45 03
1988 43 .04 51 03
1989 40 04 .54 03
1990 41 ,03 54 .02
1991 42 ,02 .55 01
1992 42 02 56 .01
1993 41 .02 56 .01
Beef Prices Over Time” Prices Relative to Australia
New
Australia Zealsnd us Other
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“The pr!ces are nominal and were adjusted m U.S. dollars using exchange rates.
‘NWZLD/AUS IS New Zealand’s price relatwe to Australia’s price over time
WSIAUS IS the U S‘s price relatwe to Australia’s price over time.
‘ROWIAUS IS the Rest of the wod&s price relative to Austraha’s price over ttme
whether Japanese import policies have had
differential effects on the three major beef exporters
(and the rest of the world (ROW)) to the Japanese
market. In particular, the paper measures
expenditure and price elasticities of Japanese beef
import demand from each of Japan’s major beef
import suppliers. In the section that follows, two
import allocation models are developed and fit to
Japanese beef import data by source, and the models
are tested to determine which better fits the data.
Expenditure and price elasticities are calculated,
and, based on the analysis, implications and
conclusions are drawn.
Model and Data
This study utilizes a system-wide approach
(as opposed to a single equation approach) and
relies on multistage budgeting under the assumption
of block independence (Theil, 1976). The allocation
problem facing the consumer, in this case Japan, is
to allocate income among broad groups of goods
(e.g., food, clothing, transportation, and education)
which are assumed to be separable, Group
expenditure is further allocated among the goods
within the group, At this level, goods are no longer
assumed to be separable.
In the first stage, following Wahl et al., the
meats group is assumed separable from other groups
of goods. In the second stage, expenditure for
meats is allocated among the types of meats which
include import quality beef as well as Wagyu beef.
Finally, expenditure for beef imports is allocated
among import sources. In this study, we estimate
the import demand for beef by source (Australia,
New Zealand, U.S., and ROW) and thus extend the
research by Wahl et al,
Using the differential approach to consumer
demand, one can derive the conditional demand
equation for imported beef by source under block
independence. Let w; = w,/lV~and O; = Q/@E,
where w; is the (conditional) trade share of imported
beef from country [, w, is the budget share of
imported beef from country I, $ represents the
imported beef group, W~= ~,,~~w, is the budget
share of the group S,, 6, is the marginal share of
imported beef from 1, and @~is the marginal share
of the group S~(imported beef). The conditional
demand equation for imported beef by source is
w: d(log q,) = e; d(log Q~) + X,,SRn:, d(log p,) (1)J. Agz and Applied Econ., Decembec 1995
where p, is the price of imported beef from
sourcej, qi is the quantity of imported beef from
1, n~,s are (conditional) Slutsky price parameters,
l d(log q,) is the Divisia and d(log Q~) = ~l~s~~i
quantity index for S, (Theil). The din equation (1)
represents a derivative for discrete changes from
one year to the next. By assuming that O; and the
n~,s in equation (1) are constant, we obtain the
conditional absolute version of the Rotterdam model
(Theil, 1986).
If we assume the marginal shares of
imported beef from 1 = 1,...,n follow those
proposed by Working, then tl~ = w; + ~,, and we
obtain the Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS)
model (Keller and Van Driel) or Working’s model
(Theil and Clements).2 Accordingly, the marginal
shares of the CBS model, unlike those of the
Rotterdam model, are functions of income (and
price) levels and thus vary over time. Substitution
for e; in (1) and subtracting w; d(log QJ from both
sides gives the CBS model,
W: (d(log q,) - d(log Q~))= ~, d(log QJ
+ x,=~g
iJ Ww P,). (2)
The Rotterdam and CBS models, although
related, are not nested. However, following Barten
one can developed a general model,
W; d(log q,) = pi d(log Q~)+ 5 w; (d(log Qg))
+ hg i, d(b P,), (3)
in which both the Rotterdam and CBS models are
nested. When 6 = O,equation (3) collapses to the
Rotterdam model, and when 6 = 1, we have the
CBS model. Hence, the general model can be used
to test for choice of functional form between the
Rotterdam and CBS models.
Operationalizing these three models utilizes
additive disturbances and requires that w~,= (w:, +
w~,,.,)/2, d(log x,,) = log x,, - log x,,.,, where x,
represents q, or pi, and D(log QK,)=~jc~~w;, d(log
q,,). All three models were fit to Japanese beef
import expenditure, quantity, and price data from
the United Nations, Statistical Papers. This data set
was collected from 1970 - 1993 on an annual
basis.3 The data were divided into four groups:
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Australia, New Zealand, United States, and all other
exporters (ROW).
The CBS and Rotterdam models were
estimated without imposing any restrictions and with
homogeneity restrictions imposed. Laitinen’s exact
homogeneity test did not reject homogeneity at the
.10 significance level for the CBS model; for the
Rotterdam model, it did not reject homogeneity at
the .05 level. Symmetry restrictions were tested
using likelihood ratio tests comparing the symmetry
and homogeneity restricted models to those of the
homogeneity restricted ones (Bewley). Symmetry
could not be rejected for either the CBS nor the
Rotterdam models at a = .05.
To determine which functional form to use,
the CBS, Rotterdam, and general models were
estimated with homogeneity and symmetry imposed.
Because the CBS and Rotterdam models are nested
within the general model, a likelihood ratio test was
used to test for functional form. The test is minus
twice the log difference between the respective
concentrated likelihood functions and is
asymptotically distributed as a chi-square with q
degrees of freedom, q representing the number of
restrictions. The likelihood ratio test rejects the
Rotterdam model at a critical value of .05; we fail
to reject the CBS model at the same critical value.
Accordingly, this test indicates that the CBS model
fits this data set better than the Rotterdam model,
and reported results are from the CBS model.
Expenditure Parameters, Marginal Shares, and
Elasticities
Report parameter and elasticity estimates
are all based on fitting the data with the CBS
model, The estimated expenditure parameters, (lis,
and their asymptotic standard errors are reported in
column 6 of table 2. The (conditional) expenditure
elasticity of demand for imported beef from source
1 of the CBS model is q; = 1 + (~jw~. Thus, a
zero expenditure parameter indicates unitary
expenditure elasticity; a positive and significant
expenditure parameter indicates an elastic
expenditure elasticity while a negative and
significant expenditure parameter indicates an
inelastic expenditure elasticity, None of the ~,s are
significantly different from zero and only for the
U.S. is ~ositive.539 Weatherspoon and Scale, JK: Do the Japanese Discriminate Against Australian Beef Imports?
Table 2. CBS ModelParameter Estimates of Import Allocation for Japanese Beef Imports by
Source, Homogeneity and Symmetry Impose& 1970-1993.
Expenditure
Conditional SIutsky Coefficients, rT~ Coefficients
Exporting
Country Australia New Zealand Us. ROW”
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) :)
Australia -0.135 0.067 0.070 -0.002 -0.002
(0.051 )’ (0.031 ) (0.039) (0.013) (0,029)
New Zealand -0,111 0.047 -0.003 -0.012
(0.029) (0.0I9) (0.012) (0.013)




“ROW = Rest of the World.
‘Asymptotic standard errors reported in parentheses.
Given that all expenditure parameters were
close to zero, we tested the CBS model for
homotheticity or unitary elasticities. The models are
nested so the likelihood ratio test was again
implemented. The test fails to reject homotheticity
at the critical value of .05. The log likelihood value
with homogeneity and symmetry imposed was
188.77; with homotheticity, it was 187.79.
The implication of homothetic expenditure
elasticities of Japanese demand for all beef imports
by source is that Japan did not discriminate in the
beef import market; without changes in relative
prices, the trade shares would have remained
unchanged.4 Thus, we look for evidence based on
relative price changes to explain the observed
changes in the trade shares.
Prices, Price Parameters, and Elasticity
Estimates
Given homotheticity, the question remains,
“why did Australia’s trade shares decrease and the
U.S.’s increase?” The answer seems to lie in the
relative price changes. Inspection of the changes in
Japan’s beef prices over time for imported beef
(table 1, columns 6-9) shows that Australia’s and
New Zealand’s prices have increased approximately
four fold from 1970 to 1993. During the same time
period, U.S. beef prices to Japan increased a little
more than 1,5 fold.5 Columns 10-12 of table I
show the changes in relative prices with respect to
Australia. Australia’s prices have been increasing
at a faster rate than those of U.S. beef while they
have increased at a similar rate with those of New
Zealand and the ROW beef. Instead of the
discrimination hypothesis, changes in relative prices
over time may explain the movements in the trade
shares for Australia and the U.S.
The price parameters were reestimated
using the CBS model with homotheticity imposed.
The conditional Slutsky price parameters for the
homothetic CBS model (symmetry and homogeneity
imposed) are reported in columns 2-5 of table 3.
All own-price parameters are negative and
significantly different from zero (et = 0.05) with the
exception of ROW. This indicates that the own
prices play a significant role in explaining the
changes in the trade shares. Of the six cross-price
parameters, two are significantly different from zero
for et = 0.05 and two others for a = 0.10. These
are Australia-U, S. (positive), New Zealand-U.S.
(positive), Australia-New Zealand (positive), and
U.S.-ROW (positive).
Conditional Slutsky price elasticities (s,,)
can be calculated as s~j= nj/wj and are reported inJ. Agr and Applied Econ., Decembec 1995 540
Table 3. HomotheticCBS Model’s Price Parameter Estimates and Slu!sky Price Elasticities of Import Demand for Japanese Beef Imports by
Source Estimated at Sample Means, 1970-1993.
Price Parameters Price Elasticities
Expmting New
Country Australia Zealand us. ROW
New
Australia Zealand us. ROW
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Australia -0,124 0058 0.076 -0.007 -0.20 0.09 012 -0.01
(0,045)’ (0.030) (0.033) (0.014) (0.07) (0.05) (o05) (0.02)
New Zealand -0,110 0.055 -0003 1,10 -2,09 105 -0,06
(0,029) (0.017) (0.012) (0.56) (0.55) (o33) (0,23)
us. -0,147 0.015 0.25 0.18 -0.48 005
(o035) (0.009) (011) (O06) (o12) (0.03)
ROW -0,005 -041 .019 0.91 -030
(0.010) (0.81) (0.71) (0.52) (056)
“ROW = Rest of the World
6Asymptotic standard errors m parentheses
table 3, columns 6-9, calculated at sample means.
Slutsky elasticities hold real income and all other
prices constant as the price of good 1 is changed; it
reflects pure substitution effects. All own-price
Slutsky elasticities are negative; those of Australia,
New Zealand, and the U.S. are significantly
different from zero (a = 0,05). Australia’s and the
U.S.’s own-price elasticities are inelastic (-0.20 and
-0.48, respectively), New Zealand’s is elastic (-2.09)
and significantly different from unitary (CX = 0.05),
and ROW is inelastic but not significantly different
from zero (u = 0.05). These results indicate that, if
the price of Australian beef drops by 1percent, the
quantity demanded will increase by approximately
0,2 percent. If the price of U.S. beef drops by one
percent, the quantity demanded will increase by
approximately 0.5 percent; if New Zealand’s beef
price decreases by 1percent, the quantity demanded
will increase by 2.1 percent. The ROW beef
demand will not be significantly affected by a
change in own price.
Wahl et al. estimated the own-price
elasticity of Japanese demand for import quality
beef conditional on total meat expenditure as unitary
(-0.98). Accordingly, the own-price elasticities of
demand for beef imports by source, conditional on
total meat expenditure, will equal (approximately
and statistically) those conditional on Japanese beef
imports expenditure. Similarly, expenditure
elasticities of demand for imported beef from source
1 conditional on total meat expenditure (qi) can
also be calculated using q, = qgq~ where qg is
the expenditure elasticities of demand for Sg(import
quality beet), and q ~is the expenditure elasticities
of demand for beef imports from source 1
conditional on total beef imports expenditure.
Using q~ = 1.51 from Wahl et al. and that all of the
q: are equal to one, q, is also equal to 1.51 for
every beef exporter to the Japanese market; all
expenditure elasticities for imported beef by source
conditional on total meat expenditures are elastic.
Accordingly, as Japanese expenditures on total
meats increase by 1 percent, expenditures on beef
imports will increase by more than 1 percent (1.5
percent).
Own-price elasticities can be calculated
over time; these estimates are reported in table 4,
columns 1-4. Australia’s own-price elasticities have
increased over time implying that demand for
Australian beef has become more own-price elastic.
The U.S. own-price elasticity fluctuated throughout
the 1970s, but since 1980, its own-price elasticity
has steadily decreased (i.e., becoming more
inelastic). Indeed, by 1993 the own-price elasticity
for Australian beef (-0.3 l) was more elastic than
that of U.S. beef (-0.26). The other two elasticities
have fluctuated over time with New Zealand’s being
elastic and becoming more elastic and with the
ROW’s being inelastic and becoming more inelastic
over time until 1992.
A SIutsky cross-price elasticity (table 3,
columns 6-9) indicates complementary goods if its
sign is negative and substitute goods if its sign is541 Weatherspoon and Scale, JK: Do the Japanese Discriminate Against Australian Beef Imports ?
Table 4, SlutSky Own-Price Elast!cttles over Time.
New
Year Australia Zealand us. ROW

























































































































positive. Of the 12cross-price elasticities, six were
statistically different from zero (a = 0,05): those of
Australia-New Zealand, Australia-U. S.,New
Zealand-Australia, New Zealand-U.S, u.s.-
Australia, and U.S.-New Zealand; those of U.S.-
ROW and ROW-U.S. were significantly different
from zero at the a = 0.10 level. Of these, all were
positive, implying that Australian,
and U.S. beef are all substitutes.
Conclusion
New Zealand,
The CBS, Rotterdam, and general models
were fit to data for beef exporters to the Japanese
market, Results from the likelihood ratio tests
indicated that the functional form of the CBS model
fit this data set better than that of the Rotterdam
model. The expenditure elasticities from the CBS
model were all unitary; accordingly, homotheticity
was tested and could not be rejected. This result
indicates that, in the absence of relative price
changes, the trade shares of beef exported to Japan
would not have changed. From this, one can
conclude that the Japanese did not discriminated
against Australian beef imports. The analysis does,
however, suggest that the changes in trade shares
over time are due to relative price changes between
Australia and U.S. beef prices. Australia, New
Zealand, and the U.S. all had negative and
significant own-price elasticities, and Australia’s
own-price elasticities have become more elastic and
the U.S,’S less elastic over time. Over the period of
study, the U.S. price relative to that of Australia has
decreased from 4.2 to 1.7. Finally, all of the
exporters of beef to Japan stand to gain as
expenditures for total meats increase.J. Ag~ and Applied Econ., December 1995 542
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Endnotes
1, Additionally, the Australians have complained that Japan favors U.S. imports in other goods, particularly
automobile parts, and have filed a complaint under GATT (The Wall Street Journal).
2. ~, represents the difference between the marginal share and the average share. If ~, > 0 then the
marginal share exceeds the average share by ~i and is elastic. (3, = Oindicates unitary elasticity. Wi is
not constant with respect to income and price, hence the marginal share is not constant (Theil and Clements,
1987).
3. The prices are nominal and were adjusted to U.S. dollars using exchange rates.
4. There have been several papers written in recent years that have criticized the Armington model for its
assumptions (Alston et al., 1990; Davis, 1993). our findings suggest that for this data set the Armington
model, should provide an accurate estimate.
5. ROW’s prices have increased 2.6 fold from 1970- 1993,